Most of these claims focus on key areas or issues, especially the role of government, with particular reference to the economy and employment, and questions of race, class, and gender. While the majority deal with the national level, some concentrate on regions or states. The best example is Alan Clive's study of Michigan, where war-boom Detroit became 'the hottest town in America'. As war industry led to a massive influx of new workers, including African Americans and women, a variety of new social problems arose. Although the most obvious consequence of the conflict was, writes Clive, 'a new and extraordinary level of material wellbeing', less apparent was the fact that 'the war accelerated forces in American life that had been disrupting the family unit for decades'.7 Thus, at the local level one can see important aspects of war and social change; firstly, that positive 'gains' could be offset by 'disruptive' consequences, and secondly, that while some changes might be new, elements of continuity were also present between the war years and earlier periods.
Similar patterns can also be observed in other areas which experienced dramatic wartime change. One writer, calling for more research, provocatively suggested that the second world war might be 'more important than the Civil War' for the southern states, while another writes that 'for many southerners World War II was a great divide' which 'reshaped their society'. Although pointing to the significance of the New Deal's southern policies, Morton Sosna argues that in changing the South from the nation's number one economic problem into an area of economic opportunity, it was the war which led to the 'breakdown of the South's economic, social, and moral isolation'.8
Certainly, the war acted as a spur to economic change such as the mechanization of the cotton industry and the further development of mass-production techniques. Economic change was the key to many other wartime developments -'the veritable orgy of war-induced spending produced the biggest boom in American economic history', writes Sosna -and there can be little doubt that, if nothing else, it was the war that ended the Depression and confirmed the United States' economic dominance of the world. While GNP increased three-fold between 1941 and 1945, more industrial plant was built in three years of war than in the previous fifteen years, much of it financed by the federal government. The development of a form of state-managed capitalism through direct financing during the war went far beyond anything the New Deal had attempted, and can be seen as a major step towards the development of the postwar military industrial complex.9
What emerges from the study of the different states and regions is the way in which federal influence grew generally during the war, affecting everything from employment to health and housing. Certainly the creation of more than thirty war agencies and the doubling in number of the federal civil service suggests that the war did much to alter the balance of power within the American political system. The rise of the 'imperial presidency' clearly began with Roosevelt's role as commander-in-chief and leading instigator of foreign policy decisions and continued with the onset of the Cold War, but the growth of federal bureaucracy during wartime was also an important factor. However, the role of government during the war can be exaggerated. Despite the plethora of war agencies, it was never as great or complete as descriptions such as The War Lords of Washington might suggest. Not until the second War Powers Act of 1942 did the President have authority to allocate priorities and resources, and the development of agencies for centralized control, culminating in the War Production Board (1942) and Office of War Mobilization (1943), often appeared faltering. With elections and congressional politics continuing almost as normal, Roosevelt's wartime administration faced resistance over issues such as taxation, labour conscription, and propaganda.'?
Nothing illustrates the limited impact of the war on America better than the history of the US propaganda effort which was often confused in its aims and constrained by political opposition. As the leading historian of the subject writes: 'In the end American propaganda reflected American policy, and indeed America itself.'" Rather than constructing war aims which might Such positive views of the war's effects blur many of the realities of wartime tensions and conflicts. Wartime affluence, often the product of long hours, obscured the persistence of poverty and the concentration of wealth (rather than just incomes) which increased rather than diminished during the war. While labour unions undoubtedly gained in strength and influence, and saw their members achieve higher earnings, they were also subject to increasing regulation and wage controls -so much so, that despite an official no-strike pledge, the combination of inflation and pay freezes resulted in an outbreak of strikes involving three million workers in 1943. The strikes led in turn to the passage of the restrictive War Labor Disputes Act, the model for the 1947 Taft Hartley Act, which sought to restrain union rights in the postwar years.
If the war strained labour harmony and pointed to the persistence of aspects of class conflict, it also exacerbated other social tensions. According to John Morton Blum, the war 'posed a special test of the ability of American culture to accommodate to its inherent pluralism'. In fact, it heightened some differences; 'If you weren't in this group you were really an outsider', recalled one woman, a fact which became all too evident for the 112,000 Japanese Americans who were re-located in concentration camps in 1942 and lost an estimated $400 million worth of property and possessions in the process. 23 The treatment of the Japanese Americans has been the subject of numerous studies and is generally condemned as a sorry episode in American history. The only conclusion which can be reached is that the government's action was justified neither morally nor in terms of national security. The fact that there was never any evidence of sabotage was merely presented as an indication of Japanese cunning, and the denial of trust even to Japanese-born Americans on the grounds of 'once a Jap always a Jap' revealed the deep-seated racism behind these actions. As the Commission on Wartime Relocation reported to Congress in 1983, the Japanese Americans were rounded up because of 'race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership'.24
Other minority groups also suffered to some extent during the war or found wartime change to be a mixed blessing. Native Americans and gays have both been the subjects of recent studies, but the wartime experience of no group has been written about as extensively as that of African Americans. While the war years were once described as 'The "Forgotten Years" of the Negro Revolution', they are now widely regarded as 'the catalyst in the struggle for equal rights' which brought 'massive changes', 'altered the political, economic, and social status of Negro Americans', and, in the old cliches, marked 'a turning-point in the Negro's relation to America', and 'a watershed in the politics of race'. 25 There is little doubt that the war emphasized the contradictions between America's democratic principles and its racial practices. The more than 240 racial incidents in 47 different towns and cities during 1943 ranged from full-scale riots in Detroit, Harlem, and Los Angeles, through to industrial conflicts, 'hate strikes', in places such as Mobile, Alabama, and lynchings in a number of different states. While some riots predominantly involved whites attacking blacks, in others, such as Harlem, African Americans focused their anger and frustration on property. Each outbreak had its unique causes, but underlying them all was the sense of change brought about by the war. As black Americans demanded more, whites called for less. These tensions were exacerbated by wartime migrations, overcrowding in defence areas, competition for jobs, and conflict over housing. 28 The war boom in defence industries led to a resumption of the migration of African Americans which had begun with the first world war but slowed during the 1930s. Half a million (17 per cent of black southerners compared with only 3 per cent of whites) left the South and others moved to cities within the South. Not only was the South 'reshaped', but according to Nicholas Lemann, the black migration 'changed America'. Certainly, African Americans recalled that during the war they 'got a chance to go places we had never been able to go before', to 'discover there was another way of life', and 'to work on jobs they never had before'. As a consequence 'their expectations changed'. 29 Some expectations were met as almost one million African American workers entered the labour force and the number of skilled and semi-skilled doubled. Even for black women there was change, although limited, in employment patterns, and it was said that 'Lincoln freed the Negroes from cotton picking but "Hitler was the one that got us out of the white folks' kitchen"'. If, despite these changes, the significant fact of war experience for black women was 'the extent to which barriers remained intact', nonetheless the war years could still be remembered by African Americans of both sexes as a very compelling, very exhilarating era. There was a feeling that you had hold of something that was big and urgent and was not going to last forever. There were opportunities for change which could not exist after the war was over. 30 The mood of change which affected the black population was evident in the variety of different challenges to white racism during the war. Individual black Americans as much as organizations used the courts to challenge segregation in the military or refused to serve; others challenged the segregation of southern transportation, and in Montgomery, Alabama, the Women's Political Council, which was to be so important in the boycott of 1954-5, was formed after several people had been arrested for challenging segregation in 1946. Voter registration drives following the Supreme Court's decision against the all-white primary in 1944 were indicative of the new mood, and resulted in a 10 per cent increase in the number of registered black voters.3' Black servicemen not only protested against discriminatory practices during active service, but were also to be found among the black political activists at the war's end. More than one million African Americans served in different branches of the armed forces, and although there were improvements and even moves towards integration, the experience was often a bitter one. Nonetheless, a recent study of black servicemen's attitudes suggests that 41 per cent expected to be better off as a result of their service compared with only 25 per cent of whites. As one African American soldier wrote, blacks 'fight because of the opportunities it will make possible for them after the war'.3
There is considerable evidence that the experience of military service increased African Americans' unwillingness to accept pre-war racial practices. Black veterans were not only more inclined to re-enlist, they were twice as likely as whites to move to a different region after the war, and by 1947 it was estimated that 75,000 had left the South. 33 The continued demographic changes increased the political influence of African Americans in northern states and undoubtedly contributed to Harry S. One problem in all this is to separate images from reality, and issues of social class from those of gender. In advertising and government propaganda the ubiquitous American wartime heroine was, of course, Rosie the Riveter, the new shipyard worker often cited as the key example of wartime advances. There clearly was some dramatic change -a survey of the shipbuilding industry in 1941 found a total of 36 female workers; in 1943 there were 160,000. As one woman recalled, 'The war years offered new possibilities. You came out to California, put on your pants and took your lunch pail to a man's job.'36 All told, more than eight million women joined the labour force, an estimated three million more than would have done so normally. However, the majority of these were women who had worked before, and those in blue-collar work generally came from a bluecollar background.
The proportion of women in the labour force rose from 25 per cent to 36 per cent during the war. More significant, 75 per cent of new women workers were married and 60 per cent were 35 or older. Several states now removed the laws (often introduced in the 1930s) prohibiting the employment of married women as teachers, and there continued to be a general change in the distribution of the female workforce towards older, married women in the postwar years. However, most long-term gains in women's employment were in areas already associated with female work. There tended to be a concentration in white-collar clerical work rather than the much publicized shipyard or other heavy work, again emphasizing the issue of social class.
Whatever the changes in female employment, most met continued resistance and opposition. A fear of so-called 'New Amazons' was widely evident and discrimination persisted. Women were generally segregated, denied top positions, and despite equal wage policies paid on average 40 per cent less than men. Even more, wartime employment gains were often temporary -two million women were laid off at the war's end, and the proportion of women in the labour force fell back down to 29 per cent. However, the percentage of women in the labour force was still higher after the war than it had been before, and by the early 1950s was growing again and was soon above 30 per cent.
Chafe points to the 'strange paradox' that, despite expanding job roles, attitudes towards women remained largely unchanged. At the war's end, government propaganda which had stressed patriotic duty in getting women out to work, now did the same to get them back into the home. Work, particularly for married women and mothers, was stressed as exceptional and in the war and postwar years 'the suburban ideal of companiate, childcentered marriages with little scope for careerism' became a dominant stereotype.37 The Ladies Home Journal could state that the nation's number one task at the end of the war was to 'make it better, easier, cheaper, and safer to have at least three babies a piece'. Nonetheless, for at least one woman 'defense work was the beginning of my emancipation as a woman. For the first time in my life I found out that I could do something with my hands besides bake.' That she doubtless spoke for many was indicated in polls in which women expressed a strong desire to stay in work at the war's end. 38 If women found at least temporary independence and liberation during the war, they also bore the brunt of domestic hardship -loneliness, uncertainty, and emotional strain in addition to the problems of coping with the demands of work and home. Separation of families due to military service or migration to war work had a particular impact on women. One described 'the misery of war'; 'pregnant women who could barely balance in a rocking train going to see their husbands for the last time ... women coming back from seeing their husbands, travelling with small children'. Marjorie Cartwright recalled her marriage to a sailor in the 7th fleet: 'I lived alone for four years durirng the war and they were the most painful, lonely years I think I will ever spend. '39 Children and the family were often seen as the greatest victims of wartime disruption. The Washington Post observed in 1944 that 'from Buffalo to Wichita it is the children who are suffering most from mass migration, easy money, unaccustomed hours of work, and the fact that mama has become a welder on the graveyard shift' [my italics].4 As if to reinforce particular stereotypes of women and to confirm the temporary (and undesirable) effects of war, child-related problems were often associated with the wartime activities of women. Considerable attention was given to 'eight-hour orphans' and 'latch-key children' and a great deal of discussion focused on juvenile delinquency which appeared to rise during the war -sometimes by 20 per cent or more.
The government assistance for childcare and nurseries through the Lanham Act of 1942 which provided funds for war-boom communities was intended to alleviate such problems. However, many women were reluctant to leave their children in the care of strangers or the state, preferring instead to leave them with relatives, friends, or even in cars in the factory car park. Such responses illustrate the ambiguities of wartime liberation and reveal the persistence of 'traditional' attitudes among women themselves. Marriage rates also suggest that the war strengthened family values rather than undermined them, as the number of marriages increased at the war's start and again at its conclusion. Not surprisingly birth rates followed suit, reaching a height of 26.6 per 1,000 of the population in 1947, and leaving a legacy which was to emerge in the 'youth culture' of the 1960s.
Whether spurred on as a way to beat the draft, or because couples contemplating marriage decided that there was no point in waiting longer, the increase in marriage was to some extent offset by the rise in divorce which also reached its highest level immediately after the war and was not to be equalled Women, marriage, and the family provide a good illustration of the excitement and confusion the war brought with it. However, the disruptive consequences of war affected more than women and children. As a consequence of military service or defence work, over twelve million people moved out of state and another thirteen million moved within states during the war. Over a million entered California alone, the location of half the nation's shipbuilding and aircraft industry. Such movement was not, of course, new -one has only to think of the Okies and Arkies of the 1930s, many of whom were now absorbed into the shipyards -but the movement was much more widespread during the war.
Many towns, large and small, were overwhelmed. While major centres like San Francisco and Detroit grew by more than half a million each, the naval town of Portsmouth, Virginia, grew from 4,500 to 48,000; the population of Seneca Falls 70 miles southwest of Chicago rose from 1,200 to 6,500 as workers came to build landing-craft on the river shore.42 In all cases, the problems were much the same only different in scale and emphasis. There were conflicts between old inhabitants and newcomers, blacks and whites, and these rivalries were often compounded by social problems resulting from overcrowding of homes, schools, and recreational facilities.
After the war such pressures, assisted by wartime savings, the GI Bill, and new federal mortgage arrangements, fuelled the housing boom which helped to create the physical reality of the postwar suburbs and the mental state associated with them. Not surprisingly, after years of disruption and change stretching back through the Depression and war years, Americans were more than willing to settle for a return to a normality and stability based on ideals of the past. Fearful of the future, ordinary Americans sought security and order in the postwar world. Betty Friedan described how women felt: 'We were all vulnerable, homesick, lonely, frightened. A pent-up hunger for marriage, home, and children was felt simultaneously by several different generations, a hunger which in the prosperity of postwar America everyone could suddenly satisfy. '43 The 
